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I. — INTRODUCTION
The development of compression standards has led to the « dematerializa-
tion era » and to the widespreading of digital files online (Shapiro and Varian,
1998 ; Varian, 2000 ; hui and Png, 2003 ; Chellappa and Shivendu, 2005 ; Peitz
and Waelbroeck, 2006a ; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). As such digital goods
used to be illegally distributed via dedicated parallel networks (e.g., peer-to-
peer networks), many commercial players have perceived their popularity as a
direct threat for their own activities, resulting from the increasing abilities of
users to participate in productive activities (Toffler, 1980 ; von hippel, 1988 ;
von hippel, 2005 ; flowers, 2008). Although many see in the developing of
« outlaw » activities the main reason for the empirically observed recent losses
in the sales of cultural goods (Liebowitz, 2006 ; Zentner, 2006), legal tools
have been found to be somewhat inefficient when facing the technical features
of illegal distribution architectures (Park and Scotchmer, 2005 ; Banerjee et
al., 2008). following the appearance of online streaming services which have
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massively led to the developing of illegal networks, some players (e.g., MGM
in the U.S. and orange or Tf1 in france) have developed new services by pro-
viding access to digital goods according to a commercial scheme. Such a situa-
tion reflects that a growing number of commercial entities have left their tra-
ditional – legal – way of fighting against the providers of illegal digital goods
and have adapted by developing new business opportunities. The VoD –
Video on Demand – commercial activity represents one of the most popular
models according to which commercial players attempt to react to the so-
called « pirate » threat. This switch may be perceived as an attempt by com-
mercial players to turn to a one-to-one competition while using their oppo-
nents’ technology and not strictly focusing on the illegal nature of their acti-
vity.
one key research question is to identify the reasons why commercial players
have developed such a competition behavior towards the players they pre-
viously used to sue. one may notably wonder why commercial players are
currently willing to act by setting up a VoD commercial activity and how they
are nowadays likely to apprehend piracy. Although such a switch may at first
sight seem surprising, an increasing body of literature has stressed that piracy
could be paradoxically beneficial to commercial activities. Several major
contributions have highlighted the importance of network effects in the valua-
tion of commercial profit and therefore the positive effect of piracy when net-
work effects are likely to be high-leveled (Liebowitz, 1985 ; Besen and Kirby,
1989 ; Conner and rumelt, 1991 ; Takeyama, 1994 ; Shy and Thisse, 1999).
Dealing with digital goods, « sampling » has been shown to have a signifi-
cant positive impact on the enhancement of the sales of commercial digital
goods (Bounie et al., 2005 ; Bounie et al., 2006, Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006b ;
Danaher et al., 2010 ; Smith and Telang, 2010) as well the increase of the
popularity of the artists concerned (Gayer and Shy, 2006 ; Gopal et al., 2006 ;
Alcalá and González-Maestre, 2010). « Sampling » in technological adoption
patterns is likely to apply in the case of digital goods inasmuch as these can be
seen as experience goods. here, the « sampling » effect enables adopters to
develop learning capabilities and to use them when adopting other goods.
« Sampling » can thus be seen as a means for agents to select the products that
better meet their expectations according to a somewhat « learning-by-using »
scheme. Considering « sampling » in the shaping of adoption trajectories, one
may easily think that commercial players might benefit from illegal diffusion
sources (e.g., illegal file-sharing and illegal streaming). Indeed, previous ille-
gal adoption might allow commercial players to enhance their sales because
adopters are more likely to improve the match between their tastes and the
characteristics of the commercial products.
focusing on the case of music, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b) develop a
theoretical model to analyze the impact of the « sampling » effect on sales
when piracy applies. Their main result is that illegal activities enable com-
mercial players to reach out higher profits thanks to the « sampling » effect
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when tastes are sufficiently heterogeneous and products are differentiated
enough. The empirical study of Bounie et al. (2006) estimates the impact of
piracy of the commercial demand for movies. The authors show that a signifi-
cant share of pirates eventually increases their demand for commercial goods.
As a matter of fact, the importance of the « sampling » effect is not the same
according to the nature of the digital goods which are analyzed. As already
stressed by Bounie et al. (2006), adopters are likely to listen to the same song
several times whereas they are less likely to watch the same movie as often.
We therefore suggest that the role of « sampling » on commercial adoption is
highly related to the way digital goods are set to be consumed. Another case
of digital goods is that of TV series with multiple episodes. In this specific
case, digital goods are complementary goods which are initially released to be
adopted in a sequential way and the goal of the commercial provider is to crea-
te a lock-in so as to lead adopters to purchase. Consequently, the « sampling »
effect should be here seen as an effect according to which the – previous –
adoption of goods is likely to influence that of – following – others. We thus
introduce a definition of – indirect – « sampling » which differs from that of
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b). As such, it also appears appropriate to consi-
der a framework in which an agent who previously adopted a digital good
from an illegal platform does not intend to later purchase the same digital good
from a commercial provider.
Introducing the indirect « sampling » effect in the analysis of commercial
adoption patterns is also relevant to identify to what extent illegal activities
have a detrimental impact on social welfare outcomes. This research question
remains of major interest, as efforts against such activities (e.g., file-sharing,
streaming) are still intensively carried out by both private groups (e.g., the
rIAA and the MPAA, namely recording Industry Association of America
and Motion Picture Association of America in the U.S.) and public authorities
(e.g., the french Government). focusing on the french case, both DADVSI
and hADoPI laws have revealed the willingness of french authorities to find
ways to prevent users from adopting goods from « pirate » networks.
however, the scope of such public policies has to be identified to see if regu-
lation towards illegal activities delivers the best social outcomes.
We analyze the impact of the illegal – downloading/streaming – activity on
the VoD commercial activity, as well as the role of indirect « sampling » in the
designing of suitable pricing strategies. To do so, we here consider the case of
TV series with multiple episodes which are expected to be adopted in a
sequential way. Building on the theoretical framework developed by Peitz and
Walbroeck (2006b), we notably present a model in which adopters may deci-
de to adopt a digital file by purchasing it, adopt it by getting it from an illegal
platform or not to adopt it. here, « sampling » effects are likely to apply when
a product is adopted from either commercial or illegal activities, but we sup-
pose that adopters are able to correct a higher-leveled information bias when
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purchasing. We identify optimal pricing and related profits. Welfare outcomes
are also dealt.
our results reveal that the outcomes of the VoD commercial provider differ
whether the illegal downloading/streaming activity applies or not and when
« sampling » is considered in the designing of pricing strategies or not. We
find that the VoD commercial provider always benefits from integrating indi-
rect « sampling » in her pricing scheme. however, this strategy does not lead
her to systematically benefit from illegal activities. Indeed, her commercial
outcome directly depends on the combined effect of two opposite effects,
namely « direct piracy » effect and « differential sampling » effect. from a
regulatory point of view, we do not find any evidence of detrimental effects
illegal activities have on welfare. our results rather exhibit that suitable – here
« sampling » – friendly – pricing strategies have to be developed to increase
welfare levels.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We first present the settings of
the model (II.). We secondly identify commercial and social welfare outcomes
by considering four cases (i.e., no downloading/streaming – no « sampling »,
no downloading/streaming – « sampling », downloading/streaming – no
« sampling » and downloading/streaming – « sampling ») and we hold a com-
parative analysis (III.). We thirdly conclude and provide directions for further
research (IV.).
II. — THE MODEL
We present a market in which all the digital goods (i.e., TV series with mul-
tiple episodes) are available on both VoD commercial platforms and illegal
platforms. however, we suggest that the contents which are available on each
type of platforms may slightly differ. Indeed, illegal platforms are likely to
provide episodes which are ripped from TV airings whereas VoD commercial
platforms may offer original features or extended versions which have not
been aired on TV. We thus call « product » the digital good which is available
on the VoD commercial platform whereas we use the term « variant » to refer
to its illegal version.
The VoD commercial provider acts as a monopolist and offers N products (N
≥ 2). As in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b), product differentiation is introduced
by using the Salop circle of unit length on which products are equidistantly
located. We define lx as the location of each product on the circle (x ∈  [1 ; N]).
The VoD commercial provider sets her profit-maximizing strategy by defining
optimal prices for the products she provides in her catalog. As generally assu-
med, and due to the informational nature of digital goods and their reproduc-
tion facilities, the marginal costs of production are set to zero. fixed costs (K)
here apply and represent the costs the VoD commercial provider has to face
when acquiring the rights to distribute all the products available in her catalog.
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on the demand side, we consider technological adopters who are uniformly
distributed on the circle and whose total mass is equal to 1. Adopters exhibit
an ideal intrinsic preference when adopting a digital good that perfectly meets
their needs. Such a good is characterized by its location l¯ . Supposing that a
consumer adopts a digital good whose location is lx, she gets a gross surplus
equal to r – t| l¯ – lx|. r represents the surplus adopters benefit from adopting at
l¯ and t is the traditional transportation cost parameter used when formalizing
product differentiation. In addition, we consider that adopters derive an addi-
tional benefit α/2 from purchasing. α represents the quality of the service that
is provided by the commercial player (e.g., legal streaming or downloading,
hD or SD quality of the file available).
We focus on the case of sequential adoption of two digital goods. hence, we
here attempt to identify to what extent illegal activities lead the VoD com-
mercial provider to revise her pricing strategy to reach out optimal outcomes.
We thus define the adoption decision process as a three-step game :
— at step 0, the VoD commercial provider releases N products and defines
her pricing strategy (p1 ; p2) for two products which are provided to be sequen-
tially adopted, namely products 1 and 2. At the same time, the illegal platform
provides N variants ;
— at step 1, adopters decide to adopt product 1, to adopt the variant of pro-
duct 1 (i.e., variant 1), or not to adopt among the previously released N pro-
ducts/variants ;
— at step 2, adopters decide to adopt product 2, to adopt the variant of pro-
duct 2 (i.e., variant 2), or not to adopt among the remaining N – 1
products/variants.
The adopters have full and common knowledge of the pricing strategy of the
VoD commercial provider. She clearly reveals her pricing rule at step 0, thus
using a linear pricing scheme (p1 = p2), a decreasing pricing scheme (p1 > p2)
or an increasing pricing scheme (p1 < p2). A decreasing pricing scheme can be
seen as a strategy which aims at keeping customers loyal by offering them
lower prices over time. In contrast, an increasing pricing scheme should be
interpreted as a commercial attempt to attract new customers by offering them
low prices before charging them higher prices for further purchases.
The adoption patterns of product/variant 2 may somewhat depend on that of
product/variant 1. Product/variant 1 and product/variant 2 are likely to deliver
the same level of ideal preference to their adopters (i.e., r). The pricing strate-
gy of the firm consequently depends on related adoption issues. We denote the
adoption strategies as (a1 ; a2), where a1 = {b1 ; d1 ; ∅1} and a2 = {b2 ; d2 ;
∅2}. b1 (resp. b2) represents a product 1 (resp. product 2) purchase strategy,
whereas d1 (resp. d2) represents a variant 1 (resp. variant 2) illegal down-
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load/streaming strategy and ∅1 (resp. ∅2) represents a product/variant 1 (resp.
product/variant 2) non-adoption strategy.
III. — OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGIES,
PROFITS AND WELFARE
We analyze the optimal pricing rules that the VoD commercial provider has
to design for her activity to be sustainable (i.e., for product 2 to be sold). Thus,
her pricing decision-making is based on a backward scheme, inasmuch as she
sets a price for product 2 so that it enables her to fully extract the surplus of
the adopters at step 2. She then sets the highest level of price for product 1 so
that all the adopters are encouraged to adopt product 1. Adoption strategies
provide utilities whose levels are defined by the following utility functions :
Ï v (b1 ; b2) = 2r + α – t| l¯ – li| – t| l¯ – lj| – p1 – p2
Ô v (b1 ; ∅2) = r + α/2 – t| l¯ – li| – p1
Ô v (∅1 ; b2) = r + α/2 – t| l¯ – lj| – p1
Ô v (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0
v (a1 ; a2) = Ì v (d1 ; d2) = 2r – t| l¯ – li| – t| l¯ – lj| – 2s
Ô v (d1 ; b2) = 2r + α/2 – t| l¯ – li| – t| l¯ – lj| – p2 – s
Ô v (d1 ; ∅2) = r – t| l¯ – li| – s
Ô v (b1 ; d2) = 2r + α/2 – t| l¯ – li| – t| l¯ – lj| – p1 – s
Ó v (∅1 ; d2) = r – t| l¯ – lj| – s
When adopters select variant 1 and/or variant 2, we suggest that they face a
cost  which represents the disutility they may get from it (e.g., length of sear-
ch processes, threats of legal lawsuits, technical constraints, etc.). li (resp. lj)
represents the location of the product that technological adopters select at
step 1 (resp. 2). We set to zero the level of utility of an agent who neither
adopts product/variant 1 nor product/variant 2 (i.e., v (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0). The value
of | l¯ – lj| depends on the learning capabilities potential adopters are likely to
develop when previously adopting related goods. The values of |l¯ – lx| (x = {i,
j}) are estimated by calculating their expected values. Such values are likely
to differ, depending on the cases we next study.
3.1. Optimal pricing strategy when illegal downloading/streaming
is not possible
When illegal download/streaming is not possible, four adoption strategies
are possible :
(a1 ; a2) = {(b1 ; b2), (b1 ; ∅2), (∅1 ; b2), (∅1 ; ∅2)}
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As adopters have to define their adoption strategies in an imperfect infor-
mational framework, pricing strategies also depend on the abilities that the
firm has to take « sampling » into account.
3.1.1. No « sampling » effect
When « sampling » effects are not taken into account in this framework, the
product that best meets the expectations of an adopter is located at lx = l¯ , whe-
reas the product that is the most inappropriate to her is located at lx so that 
| l¯ – lx| = 1/2. The expected utility functions of the users are expressed as fol-
lows :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) = 2r + α – t/2 – p1 – p2
Ô u (b1 ; ∅2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p1u (a1 ; a2) = Ì
Ô u (∅1 ; b2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p2
Ó u (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0
Lemma 1. When illegal downloading/streaming is not possible and « sam-
pling » effects are not considered, the VoD commercial provider sets out
linear pricing rule (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 – t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4) and makes profit
p * = 2r + α – t/2 – K. See Appendix 1.
Assumption 1. When illegal dowloading is impossible, the VoD commercial
provider can generate profits from her activity, i.e., 2r + α – t/2 – K ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 stresses that transportation costs and production costs are like-
ly to be overcome by the benefits the adopters get from the purchase of both
product 1 and product 2.
3.1.2. « Sampling » effect
When « sampling » effects are taken into account, adopters can develop lear-
ning capabilities about the location of the product that best meets their needs.
Indeed, they get additional information from previous consumption (i.e.,
consumption of product 1) and uncertainty is likely to be weakened. here, fol-
lowing the purchase of product 1, the next product (i.e., product 2) that best
meets the expectations of an adopter is located at lx = l¯ , whereas the product
that is the most inappropriate to her is located at lx so that | l¯ – lx| = 1/2N. The
expected utility functions of the adopters are thus expressed as follows :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – p1 – p2
Ô u (b1 ; ∅2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p1u (a1 ; a2) = Ì
Ô u (∅1 ; b2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p2
Ó u (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0
Lemma 2. When illegal downloading/streaming is not possible and « sam-
pling » effects are considered, the VoD commercial provider sets out increa-
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sing pricing rule (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 – t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4N) and makes profit
p * = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – K. See Appendix 2.
from Assumption 1, one can easily find that p * = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – K > 0.
3.2. Optimal pricing rule when illegal downloading/streaming
is introduced
When illegal downloading/streaming is introduced, nine adoption strategies
are possible : (a1 ; a2) = {(b1 ; b2), (b1 ; ∅2), (∅1 ; b2), (∅1 ; ∅2), (d1 ; d2), (d1 ;
b2), (d1 ; ∅2), (b1 ; d2), (∅1 ; d2)}
3.2.1. No « sampling » effect
When « sampling » effects are not taken into account, the digital good that
best meets the expectations of an adopter is located at lx = l¯ , whereas the digi-
tal good that is the most inappropriate to her is located at lx so that | l¯ – lx| =
1/2. The expected utility functions of the users are expressed as follows :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) = 2r + α – t/2 – p1 – p2
Ô u (b1 ; ∅2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p1
Ô u (∅1 ; b2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p2
Ô u (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0
u (a1 ; a2) = Ì u (d1 ; d2) = 2r – t/2 – 2s
Ô u (d1 ; b2) = 2r + α/2 – t/2 – p2 – s
Ô u (d1 ; ∅2) = r – t/4 – s
Ô u (b1 ; d2) = 2r + α/2 – t/2 – p1 – s
Ó u (∅1 ; d2) = r – t/4 – s
Assumption 2. Differentiation parameter t is defined so that 4 (r – s) ≥ t > 0.
We assume that commercial players are not likely to incite adopters not to
download pirate digital goods when defining their offer strategy.
Lemma 3. When illegal downloading/streaming is possible and « sampling »
effects are not considered, the VoD commercial provider sets out linear pri-
cing rule (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s ; α/2 + s) and makes profit p * = α + 2s – K if
K ≤ α + 2s. If K > α + 2s, she does not provide digital goods and p * = 0. See
Appendix 3.
As found in 3.1.1., the VoD commercial provider is likely to apply a linear
pricing strategy to maximize her profit when illegal downloading/streaming is
introduced.
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3.2.2. « Sampling » effect
When « sampling » is introduced into the pricing decision of the VoD com-
mercial provider, she considers that adopters get additional information from
previous consumption (i.e., consumption of product/variant 1). We neverthe-
less suggest that modes of consumption (i.e., purchase and illegal downloa-
ding/streaming) are likely to deliver different learning outcomes. Moreover,
we state that adopters better correct informational uncertainty when purcha-
sing than when adopting from an illegal platform. our view is that learning
disturbances are likely to apply following the adoption of variant 1. our first
motive is that variants may slightly differ from products. Adopting variants
thus provide lesser abilities to generate a high level of correction when infor-
ming the adopters about the product which best meets their needs. our second
motive is that other detrimental effects may also apply in the case of illegal
adoption. for instance, illegal platforms generally offer communication fea-
tures (e.g., message boards, chatrooms) which may eventually lead to the pro-
vision of spoilers if they are not correctly managed. Such spoilers are harmful
for adopters since these are likely to inform them about critical events in the
storyline of TV series. In some cases, spoilers give them a wrong view about
the value they may derive from the TV series if seen in a proper (i.e., sequen-
tial) way, as explicitly designed by the official provider.
on the one hand, following the purchase of product 1, the next product (i.e.,
product 2) that best meets the expectations of an adopter is located at lx = l¯ ,
whereas the product that is the most inappropriate to her is located at lx so that
| l¯ – lx| = 1/2N. on the other hand, following the adoption of variant 1, product
2 that best meets the expectations of adopter is located at lx = l¯ , whereas the
product that is the most inappropriate to her is located at lx so that | l¯ – lx| = 1/4.
The expected utility functions of the users are expressed as follows :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – p1 – p2
Ô u (b1 ; ∅2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p1
Ô u (∅1 ; b2) = r + α/2 – t/4 – p2
Ô u (∅1 ; ∅2) = 0
u (a1 ; a2) = Ì u (d1 ; d2) = 2r – 3t/8 – 2s
Ô u (d1 ; b2) = 2r + α/2 – 3t/8 – p2 – s
Ô u (d1 ; ∅2) = r – t/4 – s
Ô u (b1 ; d2) = 2r + α/2 – t/4 – t/4N – p1 – s
Ó u (∅1 ; d2) = r – t/4 – s
Lemma 4. When illegal downloading/streaming is possible and « sampling »
effects are not considered, the VoD commercial provider sets out decreasing
pricing rule (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s + t/8 – t/4N ; α/2 + s) and makes profit p * =
α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N – K if K ≤ α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N. If K > α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N,
she does not provide digital goods and p * = 0. See Appendix 4.
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In a framework in which illegal platforms are introduced, the VoD commer-
cial provider sets out an optimal linear pricing rule when she does not take
learning effects into account, whereas she sets an optimal decreasing one when
she considers « sampling ».
3.3. Analyzing the impact of illegal downloading/streaming
on profit and welfare
3.3.1. Profits
We first hold a comparative analysis to investigate to what extent profits
evolve when illegal downloading/streaming is introduced and/or « sampling »
is taken into account by the VoD commercial provider when designing her
price strategy.
Proposition 1. The level of profit the VoD commercial provider obtains when
« sampling » is introduced is higher than that reached out when « sampling »
is not considered, all other things being equal.
Proof of Proposition 1. As t/4 > t/4N, t/2 > t/4 + t/4N. As a consequence, 2r
+ α – t/4 – t/4N – K > 2r + α – t/2 – K. Besides, let us suppose that K ≤ α +
2s. As N ≥ 2, t/8 ≥ t/4N. Therefore, α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N – K ≥ α + 2s – K. n
The VoD commercial provider’s account for sampling effects in her pricing
decision-making is likely to increase her profit, all other things being equal.
Such a concern leads her to develop non-linear (i.e., increasing or decreasing)
pricing rules to extract a higher surplus than when learning effects are not
taken into account. one can easily observe that the highest level of profit the
VoD commercial provider can reach out is obtained when she takes « sam-
pling » into account in framework in which the illegal downloading/streaming
activity does not apply. In a similar fashion, the lowest level of profit the com-
mercial VoD provider can reach out is obtained when she does not take « sam-
pling » into account in a framework in which the illegal downloading/strea-
ming activity applies. Alternative commercial outcomes are nevertheless
somehow more involved to compare. Indeed, we find that the profit which is
reached out when « sampling » is taken into account and the illegal downloa-
ding/streaming activity applies is higher-leveled than that which is reached out
when « sampling » is not taken into account in a context in which the illegal
downloading/streaming activity does not apply when the following inequality
holds :
2 (r – s) ≤ (t/8 – t/4N) – (– t/2). (1)
(1) Let us note that (r – s) > 0 from assumption 2. In addition, as N ≥ 2, we find that
(t/8 – t/4N) – (– t/2) > 0.
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The interpretation of this condition can be explained in terms of two oppo-
site effects, namely « direct piracy » effect and « differential sampling » effect.
on the one hand, the « direct piracy effect » is related to the incentives of the
adopters to get digital files from illegal platforms, which is here captured by s.
Such an effect is obviously found to be harmful to the VoD commercial pro-
vider. on the other hand, the « differential sampling effect » results from the
additional learning the adopters generate from acquiring digital files from ille-
gal platforms rather than the VoD commercial provider. As the VoD com-
mercial provider can partially extract a larger part of the surplus of her custo-
mers when the illegal downloading/streaming activity is introduced, we find
that the « differential sampling effect » positively impacts on her profit. This
effect is here captured by (t/8 – t/4N) – (– t/2). As such, the combined effect
of both « direct piracy » effect and « differential sampling » effect is shown to
be profitable for the VoD commercial provider when the « differential sam-
pling » effect is greater than the « direct piracy » effect (figure 1a). When the
« direct piracy » effect overcomes the « differential sampling » effect, the
introduction of the illegal downloading/streaming activity is always found to
lead to lower-leveled profits (figure 1b).
from both figure 1a and figure 1b, we see that the illegal downloading/strea-
ming activity is detrimental to the VoD commercial activity, whether « sam-
pling » is considered or not. Indeed, when only considering the « direct pira-
cy » effect, we do not evidence any potential profit-enhancing effect from out-
law activities.
FIGURE 1a
Profits – « differential sampling » effect overcomes « direct piracy » effect
FIGURE 1b
Profits – « direct piracy » effect overcomes « differential sampling » effect
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3.3.2. Welfare
We analyze the impact of both « sampling » and outlaw activities on welfa-
re so as to point out suitable public policies. At the optimal state, the pricing
strategy of the VoD commercial provider is set out so that all the agents pur-
chase the official digital goods available on the VoD commercial platform.
Welfare is then defined as the sum of adopters’ and VoD commercial provi-
der’s surplus, i.e.,
W = CSVoD + p * =   Ú
n=0
1
u * (b1 ; b2) dn + p * = u * (b1 ; b2) + p *.
Table 1 displays the levels of profit, adopters’ surplus and ensuing welfare
obtained at the optimal state, according to both the way the commercial VoD
provider takes « sampling » into account in her pricing strategy and the likeli-
hood of illegal activities to apply or not.
from Table 1, we see that the illegal downloading/streaming activity does
not have an impact on welfare levels. The interpretation of this result is that
the « direct piracy » effect leads to a full transfer of utility from the VoD com-
mercial provider to the adopters. however, the likelihood of the VoD com-
mercial provider to take « sampling » into account in her pricing strategy posi-
tively impacts on welfare. one explanation is that only the « differential sam-
pling » effect leads to a welfare increase because it enables the VoD commer-
cial provider to – yet partially – extract a higher level of surplus from the adop-
ters. Welfare levels only thus depend on the abilities of the VoD commercial
provider to integrate « sampling » into her pricing scheme.
Such findings clearly exhibit a conflict of interest between adopters and the
VoD commercial provider. Illegal activities have ceteris paribus been shown
to be detrimental to commercial activities because they prevent the VoD com-
mercial provider from fully extracting the adopters’ surplus. however, we do
not find any evidence of detrimental effects illegal activities may have on wel-
fare. our results rather exhibit that suitable – here « sampling » – friendly –
pricing strategies have to be developed to increase welfare levels.
TABLE 1 – Profits, adopters’ surplus and welfare
No « sampling » « Sampling »
No illegal Ï CSVoD = 0 Ï CSVoD = 0
downloading/ Ì p* = 2r + α – t/2 – K Ì p* = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – K
streaming Ó W = 2r + α – t/2 – K Ó W = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – K
Illegal Ï CSVoD = 2r – 2s – t/2 Ï CSVoD = 2r – 2s – 3t/8
downloading/ Ì p* = α + 2s – K Ì p* = α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N – K
streaming Ó W = 2r + α – t/2 – K Ó W = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N – K
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IV. — DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this article we have presented a model to analyze the impact of the illegal
downloading/streaming activity on the VoD commercial activity, as well as
the role of indirect « sampling » in the shaping of adoption trajectories. To do
so, we have focused on the case of sequential adoption of two digital goods by
taking the example of TV series with multiple episodes.
our model reveals the existence of two opposite effects, namely « direct
piracy » effect and « differential sampling » effect. The combination of both
effects directly impacts on the outcome of the VoD commercial provider. A
main result is that the VoD commercial provider’s account for indirect « sam-
pling » in her pricing decision-making leads her to increase her profit, all other
things being equal. Moreover, we find that the setting out of non-linear (i.e.,
increasing or decreasing) pricing rules enables her to extract a higher surplus
than that she would get if linear ones are preferred. however, such pricing
strategies are not always found to allow her to benefit from illegal activities.
Indeed, we have identified specific settings in which the « direct piracy »
effect overcomes the « differential sampling » effect. In such settings, the
introduction of the illegal downloading/streaming leads her to lower-leveled
profits.
from a regulatory point of view, the results of our model stress that outlaw
activities are not likely to influence welfare levels. Although outlaw activities
decrease the levels of profit reached by commercial players, they enable adop-
ters to increase their surplus. Such welfare levels rather depend on the way
commercial players consider learning effects – here « indirect sampling » – to
set out pricing strategies. As a consequence, the public policies led to evict
outlaw players from the market are not here found to be suitable for welfare-
enhancing purposes. on the contrary, commercial players have been shown to
be key players in the improvement of welfare levels. As such, relevant public
efforts could be carried out to help commercial players to identify external
(e.g., illegal) distribution channels so that these could revise their pricing stra-
tegies.
focussing on indirect « sampling », our results contrast with previous fin-
dings that have stressed that – direct – « sampling » effects may overcome
« competition » effects (Bounie et al., 2005 ; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006b).
our findings thus reveal that the impact of « sampling » on commercial out-
comes is not the same in the case of music and in the case of TV series with
multiple episodes. We therefore suggest that further piracy-related analyses
should establish a clear distinction between « sampling » and indirect « sam-
pling », inasmuch as the scope of two such effects is likely to differ.
The study we have carried out nevertheless has some limitations. first of all,
we have defined our model so as to analyze the sequential adoption trajecto-
ries of two products. Studying such patterns on the long run would allow us to
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better understand the role of indirect « sampling » on commercial outcomes
when illegal downloading/streaming is possible. By considering an oligopo-
listic framework in which several VoD commercial providers compete, we
would secondly be able to more precisely identify the impact of illegal activi-
ties on profits when network effects apply. one may finally find appropriate
to introduce both direct and indirect « sampling » when studying adoption
issues and ensuing outcomes in a context in which piracy cannot be prevented.
Indeed, although we have stated that « sampling » is likely to be weaker than
indirect « sampling » in the case of TV series with multiple episodes, it
appears relevant to analyze the impact of the combination of both effects on
profits and welfare.
The analysis of piracy-related tracks therefore leaves room for further
research. As many contributions have already underlined, we find that com-
mercial players remain able to design suitable – here pricing – strategies to
develop in the so-called « hostile » environment in which they are nowadays
likely to evolve, while the recent public policies carried out to prevent illegal
activities have been shown to have no effect on welfare levels. As such, the
cultural goods market may be somehow seen as an ecosystem in which com-
mercial players have to adapt to the development of external activities.
REFERENCES
ALCALá f. and GoNZáLEZ-MAESTrE M. (2010), « Copying, Superstars, and Artistic
Creation », Information Economics and Policy, vol. 22, n° 4, pp. 365-378.
BANErjEE B.-S., BANErjEE T. and rAyChAUDhUrI A. (2008), « optimal Enforcement
and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement », Japanese Economic
Review, vol. 59, n° 4, pp. 519-535.
BELLEfLAMME P. and PEITZ M. (2010), « Digital Piracy : Theory », CORE Discussion
Paper 2010/60.
BESEN S.-M. and KIrBy S.-N. (1989), « Private Copying, Appropriability, and optimal
Copying royalties », Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 32, n° 2, pp. 255-280.
BoUNIE D., BoUrrEAU M. and WAELBroECK P. (2005), « Pirates or Explorers ?
Analysis of Music Consumption in french Graduate Schools », Working paper EC-05-01,
ENST Paris, Paris, france.
BoUNIE D., BoUrrEAU M. and WAELBroECK P. (2006), « Piracy and the Demand for
films : Analysis of Piracy Behavior in french Universities », Review of Economic Research
on Copyright Issues, vol. 3, n° 2, pp. 15-27.
EI139-GORDAH-XP:Mise en page 1  02/10/12  18:21  Page22
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°139, 3ème trimestre 2012 23
ChELLAPPA r.-K. and ShIVENDU S. (2005), « Managing Piracy : Pricing and Sampling
Strategies for Digital Experience Goods in Vertically Segmented Markets », Information
Systems Research, vol. 16, n° 4, pp. 400-417.
CoNNEr K.-r. and rUMELT r.-P. (1991), « Software Piracy - An Analysis of Protection
Strategies », Management Science, vol. 37, n° 2, pp. 125-139.
DANAhEr B., DhANASoBhoN S., SMITh M.-D. and TELANG r. (2010), « Converting
Pirates Without Cannibalizing Purchasers : The Impact of Digital Distribution on Physical
Sales and Internet Piracy », Marketing Science, vol. 29, n° 6, pp. 1138-1151.
fLoWErS S. (2008), « harnessing the hackers : The Emergence and Exploitation of outlaw
Innovation », Research Policy, vol. 37, n° 2, pp. 177-193.
GAyEr A. and Shy o. (2006), « Publishers, Artists, and Copyright Enforcement »,
Information Economics and Policy, vol. 18, n° 4, pp. 374-384.
GoPAL r.-D., BhATTAChArjEE S. and SANDErS G.-L. (2006), « Do Artists Benefit from
online Music Sharing ? », Journal of Business, vol. 79, n° 4, pp. 1503-1534.
von hIPPEL E. (1988), The Sources of Innovation, oxford University Press, New york, Ny.
von hIPPEL E. (2005), Democratizing Innovation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
hUI K.-L. and PNG I. (2003), « Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for recorded Music »,
Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 2, n° 1, pp. 1-11.
LIEBoWITZ S.-j. (1985), « Copying and Indirect Appropriability : Photocopying of journals »,
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93, n° 5, pp. 945-957.
LIEBoWITZ S.-j. (2006), « file-Sharing : Creative Destruction or just Plain Destruction? »,
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 49, n° 1, pp. 1-28.
PArK y. and SCoTChMEr S. (2005), « Digital rights Management and the Pricing of Digital
Products », NBER Working Papers 11532.
PEITZ M. and WAELBroECK P. (2006a), « Piracy of Digital Products : A Critical review of
the Theoretical Literature », Information Economics and Policy, vol. 18, n° 4, pp. 449-476.
PEITZ M. and WAELBroECK P. (2006b), « Why the Music Industry May Gain from free
Downloading - The role of Sampling », International Journal of Industrial Organization,
vol. 24, n° 5, pp. 907-913.
ShAPIro C. and VArIAN h.-r. (1998), Information Rules : A Strategic Guide to the Network
Economy. harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA.
Shy o. and ThISSE j. (1999), « A Strategic Approach to Software Protection », Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 8, n° 2, pp. 163-190.
SMITh M.-D. and TELANG r. (2010), « Piracy or Promotion? The Impact of Broadband
Internet Penetration on DVD Sales », Information Economics and Policy, vol. 22, n° 4,
pp. 289-298.
TAKEyAMA L.-N. (1994), « The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized reproduction of
Intellectual Property in the Presence of Network Externalities », Journal of Industrial
Economics, vol. 42, n° 2, pp. 155-166.
ToffLEr A. (1980), The Third Wave, William Morrow and Co., New york, Ny.
VArIAN h.-r. (2000), « Buying, Sharing and renting Information Goods », Journal of
Industrial Economics, vol. 48, n° 4, pp. 473-488.
ZENTNEr A. (2006), « Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases »,
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 49, n° 1, pp. 63-90.
EI139-GORDAH-XP:Mise en page 1  02/10/12  18:21  Page23
24 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°139, 3ème trimestre 2012
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : Proof of Lemma 1
The VoD commercial provider sets her prices so that u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; ∅2)
and u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (b1 ; ∅2). The VoD commercial provider sets her prices so
that she builds a lock-in strategy according to which adopters are always
willing to purchase product 2 if she has previously purchased product 1. To
extract the expected surplus from the adopters, the VoD commercial provider
sets (p1* ; p2*) so that u (b1 ; b2) = u (∅1 ; ∅2) and u (b1 ; b2) = u (b1 ; ∅2). We
find that (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 – t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4). At such price levels, we
observe that u (b1 ; b2) = u (∅1 ; b2). All the constraints being satured, the set-
ting out of the linear pricing rule we identify allows the VoD commercial pro-
vider to fully serve the market. As a consequence, the profit-maximizing firm
makes here profit p * = 2r + α – t/2 – K by setting out (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 –
t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4).
Appendix 2 : Proof of Lemma 2
As stated in the case in which « sampling » is not introduced, the VoD com-
mercial provider sets her prices so that u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; ∅2) and u (b1 ; b2)
≥ u (b1 ; ∅2). To extract the expected surplus from the adopters, the VoD com-
mercial provider sets (p1* ; p2*) so that u (b1 ; b2) = u (∅1 ; ∅2) and u (b1 ; b2) =
u (b1 ; ∅2). We find that (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 – t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4N ). At such
price levels, we observe that u (b1 ; b2) > u (∅1 ; b2). hence, the setting out of
such a pricing strategy allows the VoD commercial provider to fully serve the
market. The profit-maximizing firm makes here profit p * = 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N
– K by setting out (p1* ; p2*) = (r + α/2 – t/4 ; r + α/2 – t/4N ).
Appendix 3 : Proof of Lemma 3
The VoD commercial provider sets her prices so that :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; ∅2) Ï 2r + α – t/2 ≥ p1 + p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (d1 ; d2) Ô α + 2s ≥ p1 + p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (d1 ; ∅2) Ì r + α – t/4 + s ≥ p1 + p2Ì ⇔
Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; d2) Ô r + α/2 – t/4 ≥ p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (b1 ; ∅2) Ó α/2 + s ≥ p2Ó u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (b1 ; d2)
To extract the expected surplus from the adopters, we find that the VoD
commercial provider sets (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s ; α/2 + s). At such price levels,
we observe that u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; b2) and u (b1 ; b2) = u (d1 ; b2). The set-
ting out of such a pricing strategy allows the VoD commercial provider to
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fully serve the market. The profit-maximizing firm makes here profit p * = α +
2s – K by setting out (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s ; α/2 + s).
Appendix 4 : Proof of Lemma 4
The VoD commercial provider sets her prices so that :
Ï u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; ∅2) Ï 2r + α – t/4 – t/4N ≥ p1 + p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (d1 ; d2) Ô α + t/8 – t/4N + 2s ≥ p1 + p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (d1 ; ∅2) Ì r + α – t/4N + s ≥ p1 + p2Ì ⇔
Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; d2) Ô r + α/2 – t/4N ≥ p2Ô u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (b1 ; ∅2) Ó α/2 + s ≥ p2Ó u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (b1 ; d2)
To extract the expected surplus from the adopters, we find that the VoD
commercial provider sets (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s + t/8 – t/4N ; α/2 + s). At such
price levels, we observe that u (b1 ; b2) ≥ u (∅1 ; b2) and u (b1 ; b2) = u (d1 ;
b2). The setting out of such a pricing strategy allows the VoD commercial pro-
vider to fully serve the market. The profit-maximizing firm makes profit p * =
α + 2s + t/8 – t/4N – K by setting out (p1* ; p2*) = (α/2 + s + t/8 – t/4N ; α/2 + s).
EI139-GORDAH-XP:Mise en page 1  02/10/12  18:21  Page25
